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Abstract.
It is unusual to review a book that is more than two or three years old, but Facing Genocide: The
Nuba of Sudan is, unfortunately, timely in its own way. Despite the significant differences between
the attacks by the government of Sudan (GoS) against the Nuba in South Kordofan from 1985
through the 1990s and those against black Africans in Darfur in the early 2000s, there are many
stunning similarities. That said, whereas international attention has focused on the ongoing crisis in
Darfur, the genocidal action in the Nuba Mountains was largely ignored—not least because the GoS
systematically and calculatingly sealed off the Nuba Mountains from the outside world for some six
years.
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It is unusual to review a book that is more than two or three years old, but Facing
Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan is, unfortunately, timely in its own way. Despite the
significant differences between the attacks by the government of Sudan (GoS) against
the Nuba in South Kordofan from 1985 through the 1990s and those against black
Africans in Darfur in the early 2000s, there are many stunning similarities. That said,
whereas international attention has focused on the ongoing crisis in Darfur, the
genocidal action in the Nuba Mountains was largely ignored—not least because the
GoS systematically and calculatingly sealed off the Nuba Mountains from the outside
world for some six years.
Facing Genocide: The Nuba of Sudan constitutes the first detailed study of the
genocidal activities of the GoS in the Nuba Mountains—a study that the authors assert
is ‘‘the first exposure of the crimes being committed there by the Sudan Government:
all-out assault on the rural Nuba’’ (v). The investigation carried out by African Rights
produced clear and abundant evidence that the GoS was intent on wiping out Nuba
society and culture.
Facing Genocide is composed of the following parts: ‘‘Summary’’ which (includes a
section titled ‘‘Components of Genocide in the Nuba Mountains’’); ‘‘The Nuba in Sudan:
A People Pushed to the Margins’’; ‘‘War in the Nuba Mountains’’; ‘‘The Nuba Today:
Genocide by Attrition’’; ‘‘Attack on Christianity; Attack on Islam’’; ‘‘The SPLA Record’’;
and ‘‘Conclusions.’’ The book provides a solid overview of the history of the war in the
Nuba Mountains and, in doing so, offers a cogent analysis of the causes of the war; the
actions of the GoS, including its scorched-earth policy, which is similar in many ways
to its later actions in Darfur; the actions and reactions of the Nuba; and the
ramifications of the war.
The civil war in the Nuba Mountains, which began during the summer of 1985,
resulted from two related events. First, the Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA)
carried out a raid on a cattle camp of Baggara Arab nomads, located near the north–
south ‘‘internal boundary.’’ In response, the Sudanese government hired the Baggara
as a militia to help fight the SPLA and to punish any civilians believed to be
‘‘sympathetic’’ to the SPLA. The authors assert that,
while the SPLA was not present in force [in the Nuba Mountains] until 1989, militia
attacks became routine and an army crackdown became intense.. . . The first stage of
the war was marked by militia raids, to loot cattle, kill and occasionally to burn villages.
In areas where SPLA units penetrated, the army also undertook mass reprisals, always
targeted at villages and civilians.. . . The war intensified with the arrival of the SPLA . . .
in 1989. It quickly overran large areas of the Nuba Mountains and unleashed
a ferocious response from the militia and army. Between 1989 and 1991 scores of
villages were burned and thousands of villagers killed in joint army and militia
assaults. (7)
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It is important to understand—and the authors do an excellent job of emphasizing
this point—that ‘‘the Nuba’’ do not constitute a monolithic group. In fact, the Nuba
comprise more than fifty tribal groups that reside in the Nuba Mountains. It is thought
that the Nuba may ‘‘represent the remnants of indigenous populations that once lived
far more widely across Sudan’’ (15). Furthermore, as the authors point out, ‘‘the term
‘Nuba’ refers to two very different sets of connotations’’ (5). First, for the Nuba people
themselves, the term ‘‘refers to the myriad cultures and traditions of the more than
fifty different tribal groups in the Nuba Mountains’’ (5). Second, ‘‘for the dominant
class in Sudan, and in particular the ruling National Islamic Front, ‘Nuba’ refers to
second class citizens—‘primitive’ black people, servants and labourers’’ (5). If this
sounds familiar to those conversant with the current crisis in Darfur, it is for good
reason; in fact, most, if not all, of those living in the so-called peripheries of Sudan
(that is, outside the riverine valley where the elites reside and rule) are considered
second-class citizens, or worse—that is, they are perceived by the powers that be as
lesser beings, inferior culturally, educationally, and in just about every other way. In
this respect, the Nuba were perceived and treated in much the same way as the black
Africans of Darfur are treated today. To put it another way, both the Nuba and the
black Africans of Darfur, along with the ‘‘Southerners of Sudan, are the victims of a
racism that pervades life in Northern Sudan’’ (5).
Like any case of genocide, the genocide of the Nuba is complicated. Among the
many factors at work in this case were an extremist Islamic agenda; systemic
racism; ongoing discrimination against the Nuba in the realms of the economy,
education, health, and political representation; and a struggle over land and natural
resources.
In contrast to Darfur, where the vast majority of the people—perpetrators and
victims alike—are Muslim, the Nuba Mountains were, and are, home to both
Christians and Muslims. Tellingly, both groups were targeted for attack. Even
before the war in the Nuba Mountains began, Christians began to be attacked by GoS
security forces, largely as a result of ‘‘a polarized political context, with Islamic
extremism in the ascendant’’ (281). Churches were desecrated or burned down;
Christians were harassed, vilified, beaten, tortured, and even killed by GoS troops and
their proxies. Muslims in the area were told that the Christians were godless and were
out to destroy Sudan.
When Muslims in the Nuba Mountains did not support the government’s actions
against the Christians and refused to take part in the desecration and destruction of
the churches, they too were targeted, and their places of worship were attacked. In
addition, those Muslims who did not adhere to the more extremist version of Islam
were also targeted as infidels. Furthermore,
despite the fact that the SPLA forces in the Nuba Mountains have been very largely led
by Moslems, successive governments have portrayed the guerrillas as fighting against
Islam. In order to do so they have withdrawn the legitimacy of Islam in the SPLA held
areas, in effect declaring all Moslems who are not with them to be infidels, and thus the
legitimate target for a Jihad. (288)
Part and parcel of the attacks on the Nuba was a systematic effort to wipe out both
the educated classes and the leadership of the Nuba. The authors report that
‘‘hundreds of chiefs, teachers merchants, civil servants, priests, lawyers, health
workers—in fact anyone with an education who might be a spokesman for the people—
have been killed’’ (2).
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Once the government troops and militias had looted and destroyed Nuba villages,
the perpetrators abducted the people and forced them into so-called peace camps. In
this way, the government depopulated the rural areas, controlled the actions and
movement of civilians, deprived the Sudanese Liberation Movement of potential
assistance, and undertook an effort to alter the Nuba way of life in fundamental ways.
The ‘‘peace camps’’ were also places of great abuse, where victims were beaten, raped,
and deprived of food. The authors record that
the innocuously named ‘‘peace camps’’ are concentration camps in the true sense of the
word. They are where the rural population is forcibly concentrated so they can be
controlled and their political and cultural identity can be changed. Peace camps are the
location of mass and systematic rape of women. They are where children are separated
from their parents and ‘‘educated’’ to become extremist Moslems in the mold of the
ruling Nationalist Islamic Front, in a process of forced acculturation. (3)
Perhaps the most telling indication that the GoS intended to commit genocide in
the Nuba Mountains is this statement by Khalid Abdel Karim Saleh, former head of
security in the Office of the Governor of Kordofan, quoted on page 137:
The ongoing order given to the troops is to kill anything that is alive, that is to say to
kill anybody, to destroy the area, to implement a scorched earth policy, to destroy
everything, to burn the area, so that nothing can exist there.
There is clear evidence that the government was largely successful in its mission:
not only as a result of the large number of villages its troops utterly destroyed but the
famine they created by destroying crops and stealing and burning foodstuffs stored by
the people for the year to come; the indiscriminate and sporadic killing of civilians; the
forced conversions; the abduction of children and their re-education and enculturation
to a different way of thinking and way of life; and the mass rapes of women and girls.
With respect to the latter, the authors cogently argue that
rape destroys the very basis of the community. It breaks the fundamental bond of the
family, the relationship between husband and wife, and breaks down the trust,
confidence and sense of identity not just of the woman who has been raped, but the
family and community. When women bear children as a result of rape, they do not have
a known, legitimate patrilineage—and so they lack an acceptable social identity. (222)
An especially strong and valuable aspect of this book is the inclusion of scores of
excerpts from first-person testimony by victims. These passages, interspersed
throughout the book, address every facet of the war against the Nuba, the genocidal
actions of the GoS, and the profound ramifications for Nuba society and culture.
Numerous and significant messages for genocide scholars and anti-genocide
activists are inherent in the case of the Nuba. First, once a regime has a taste of
genocide and gets away with it, it is likely to be prepared to carry it out again. In other
words, impunity for major violations of human rights (whether crimes against
humanity or genocide) must not continue unabated. Second, when a nation closes off
an area (as the Khmer Rouge did between 1975 and 1979 while undertaking the
genocide of their own people, as the GoS did while carrying out its genocide by attrition
against the Nuba, and as, to a certain and significant extent, the GoS has operated
during its genocidal attacks on the black Africans of Darfur), there cannot be a much
clearer early warning signal that something grossly wrong is taking place within that
area. Third, there is a need for some sort of international convention and law dealing
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with regimes that seal off parts of their countries. Granted, this is much easier said
than done, as it impinges directly on state sovereignty; but it also brings to the fore the
concept of the Responsibility to Protect, and what this concept means in reality rather
than in theory—particularly for the people on the ground who are destined to be
victimized by such a sealing off.
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